Taking the wrong steps in Iraq

The White House is right to insist that our postwar goal is a unified Iraq, as opposed to one divided along ethno-religious lines. So why is the administration taking so many actions that make holding the country together virtually impossible? In January, President George W. Bush diverted nearly half the money allocated to reconstruction in Iraq to other needs, including security. Bush's decision sent a terrible signal to the Iraqis about our resolve. It is even less understandable given that the expense of the reconstruction program is only a fraction of our annual costs in Iraq. Next the administration deeply cut financing for democratization efforts, many of them undertaken by nongovernmental groups. The proposed budget for fiscal 2007 asks for a paltry $63 million. This token sum - in a war that costs some $200 million a day - may reflect a belief that the security situation prevents such efforts from being effective. But democratization has always been one of the administration's cherished goals, and cutting spending there sends the wrong message. The latest administration budget also recommends cutting overall Army and Marine troop strength. If Bush and his advisers are really committed to a "long war" in Iraq, how do they reconcile that with cutting the budgets for the most engaged forces? Bush and his aides have also repeatedly hinted at significant troop reductions in Iraq this year - perhaps to as low as 100,000 from the current 130,000. This, despite the growing violence in Baghdad and the fact that our military leaders have consistently said that we can withdraw troops safely only if conditions improve. What do the Iraqis think? The administration has long stated that the so- called Provincial Reconstruction Teams - groups of 100 or so political, economic, legal and civil-military-relations specialists who help distribute aid and advise regional officials - are critical to our strategy in Iraq. Yet The Washington Post reported in April that only four of the proposed 16 teams had even been inaugurated. In addition the Army staffs and units in Iraq, even those training Iraqi security forces, continue to be undermanned. Last, the administration has repeatedly said that efficient and law-abiding Iraqi security forces are central to our strategy, yet it has failed to provide them with more than minimal equipment. Most Iraqi troops are using open-backed trucks and unarmored SUVs. Let's face it: This laundry list of inaction on the part of the Bush administration leaves a prudent Iraqi with no practical choice but to prepare for a U.S. withdrawal long before the Iraqi central government and security forces are capable of running the nation. For most Iraqis - Arab or Kurd, Sunni or Shiite - this will mean looking to religious and ethnic militias, criminal gangs and Islamist insurgents for protection. This, in turn, greatly increases the chance of civil war. The militias are already looking ahead. Some are carving out safe areas that they will use as bases in the coming war by driving Iraqis of other ethnic and religious groups out of mixed neighborhoods and villages. Iraqi officials estimate that more than 100,000 families have already fled their homes. This falling back on militias and preparing for internecine conflict is exactly what we saw in Afghanistan nearly two decades ago. Once the Afghans believed that Soviet troops were pulling out, the insurgent groups stopped fighting the invaders and began positioning for a multisided civil war. That conflict lasted until the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001. The Bush administration, despite all its missteps since the fall of the Baathists, has clung to one correct idea: that an intact Iraq is a better outcome than a splintered one. To keep it unified, however, the White House must commit itself to long timelines and to providing the money necessary for both the military and reconstruction efforts. The alternative is for Bush to change his mind and tell the American and Iraqi peoples that we must start planning for a peaceful division. In any case, the uncertainty resulting from trying to have it both ways will result in the worst possible outcome: open civil war. Thomas X. Hammes, author of "The Sling and the Stone: On Warfare in the 21st Century," is a retired Marine colonel based in Oxford, England.