Beyond the intolerable human suffering, huge flows of refugees could spread Iraq's conflict far beyond its own borders. This is not a problem that can be ignored.
An honest assessment of Iraq's army
This White House has been spinning on Iraq for so long that we suppose we should thank Maliki for his recent reality check: his decision to send Iraqi forces into Basra to oust militias loyal to the radical cleric Moktada al-Sadr.
It was not a pretty sight. One thousand Iraqi soldiers and police officers refused to fight or deserted their posts. The battle ended with no winner and only after the Iranians helped broker a cease-fire.
Bush and Petraeus owe the country a rigorous and honest assessment of the U.S. training program, starting with what went wrong in Basra. What needs to be changed now to increase the chances that the Iraqi Army will eventually be able to fight its own battles? How long, realistically, will it take for that to happen?
Bush's capacity for denial is limitless. Perhaps he believes that the next president will continue this misadventure without any end in mind, let alone in sight. Even then he owes it to his successor to use his remaining nine months in office to try to address Iraq's myriad problems. That will not excuse Bush's serial failures. But it may increase the chances for the inevitable withdrawal to be as orderly as possible.
Bush has all the time he needs, but Iraq's suffering civilians do not, and neither do its masses of refugees, the bloodied and strained U.S. armed forces, or the American public
Beyond the intolerable human suffering, huge flows of refugees could spread Iraq's conflict far beyond its own borders. This is not a problem that can be ignored.
An honest assessment of Iraq's army
This White House has been spinning on Iraq for so long that we suppose we should thank Maliki for his recent reality check: his decision to send Iraqi forces into Basra to oust militias loyal to the radical cleric Moktada al-Sadr.
It was not a pretty sight. One thousand Iraqi soldiers and police officers refused to fight or deserted their posts. The battle ended with no winner and only after the Iranians helped broker a cease-fire.
Bush and Petraeus owe the country a rigorous and honest assessment of the U.S. training program, starting with what went wrong in Basra. What needs to be changed now to increase the chances that the Iraqi Army will eventually be able to fight its own battles? How long, realistically, will it take for that to happen?
Bush's capacity for denial is limitless. Perhaps he believes that the next president will continue this misadventure without any end in mind, let alone in sight. Even then he owes it to his successor to use his remaining nine months in office to try to address Iraq's myriad problems. That will not excuse Bush's serial failures. But it may increase the chances for the inevitable withdrawal to be as orderly as possible.
Bush has all the time he needs, but Iraq's suffering civilians do not, and neither do its masses of refugees, the bloodied and strained U.S. armed forces, or the American public